LEGISLATION
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE ALIEN

IN HIS RIGHT TO WoRK-The prevalent impression that restrictions on the

non-political 1 rights of aliens are steadily dwindling in number and significance
is not substantiated by an examination of the statute books. On the contrary,
such examination shows recent legislation the marked tendency of which is not
only to retain most of the earlier forms of discrimination,2 but to impose many
additional limitations on aliens' rights. Most striking is the large body of new
legislation making citizenship 3 a requisite for employment in public projects
and in many professions and trades. This widespread legislation, apparently the
resultant of an admixture of economic, nationalistic, and political 4 forces, raises
important and interesting questions of constitutionality which, mainly because
of the recency of the legislation, have not yet been fully brought before the
courts.
It is well settled that the power of the state to discriminate against an alien
in his capacity of potential employee does not extend to the point where the effect
of the legislation would be to deprive him of substantially all opportunity to
i. That political rights and duties do not attach to aliens follows from the very definition of citizenship. Thus aliens do not ordinarily have the right to hold office, to vote, to be
jurors; nor are they subject to conscription in time of war. Some states, however, have expressly conferred upon aliens or declarants limited political rights, e. g., the right to vote, or
to be a juror. CLEVELAND, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (1927) 167.
2. The most important of the earlier forms of discrimination was in respect to aliens' property rights. Restriction upon aliens' rights to acquire, hold, and dispose of interests in realty
still exist in eighteen states. Eleven others limit real property holding to perons eligible to
citizenship. For a list of such statutes see STATE LAW INDEX (1925-1926) 417.
3. A large number of the statutes make it sufficient if the person seeking admission to
the regulated occupation has filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen. Accountants:
IOWA CODE (1931) c. 9, § 1905; MIcE. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 8651; TENN. CODE (1932) § 7084.
Architects: IOWA CODE (1931) § i9o5-b8; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1933) c. 15,
§ 1478. Barbers: IDAHO CODE (1932) § 53-6o6; IowA CODE: (1931) § 2585-b13. Cosmeticians:
IDAHO CODE (1932) § 53-1205. Dentists: N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1933) c. 15, § 1306.
Physicians and Surgeons: R. I. Laws 1927, c. lO29; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 290. Official Court
Reporters: Colo. Laws 1925, c. 159. Optometrists: N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929)
§ 98-io6. Pharmacists: CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 5886, § 2; Vt. Laws 1927,
c. io6; Wis. STAT. (1931) §151.o2. Real Estate Brokers: Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931)
C. 97, § 404. Surveyors and Engineers: N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1933) c. 15, § 1452.
Teachers in Public Schools: Tex. Laws 1929, c. 38. The right of the declarant to continue
in the occupation is frequently made conditional upon his completing naturalization within a
limited time. Accountants: FLA. Comp. LAWS (1927) § 3923 (license revocable if not a citizen within 6 years); Hawaii Laws 1923, No. 158 (2 years); N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill,
1930) c. 15, § 1492 (8 years) ; N. D. Laws 1925, c. 2 (I year). Physicians: N. J. CoMP.
STAT. (Supp. 1930) 968 (6 years) ; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 15, § 1259 (io years).
Real Estate Brokers: N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 51, § 44o (5 years). Shot-firers
in Coal Mines: Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) C. 23, § 165 (declarant must exercise due diligence to get final papers).
4. Political influences play an important role in bringing about legislation of this nature.
Pressure to pass such legislation exerted by voters upon those who control legislation finds
no compensating force in objections of the alien since, having no voice in the selection of
those persons, his interests are ignored. A striking example of effective political pressure
was presented in Detroit in 1926. In the course of one of the spasmodic surges of public
opinion against migratory Canadian workers, the city council, induced apparently solely by
certain small labor-union cliques who had large control over the outcome of elections, passed
an ordinance discharging all alien employees of the city. An immediate reaction, however,
combined with the great inconvenience that resulted, led to a restoration of the earlier conditions. See LITERARY DIGEST, March 22, 193o, at 16.
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engage in any legitimate occupation,5 since this would result in the effective
exclusion of aliens from the jurisdiction, the sole power to do which is impliedly
vested in Congress 6 and is embodied in its immigration and deportation enactments. This objection does not exist where there is exclusion from only certain
types of occupations, and the validity of such restrictive measures depends, in
the last analysis, upon whether the basis for discrimination between citizens and
aliens in such occupations is of sufficient social desirability 7 to satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since an alien is a "person" within
the meaning of that Amendment, he is entitled to the protection afforded by the
"due process" and "equal protection" clauses 8 and a restriction upon his right
to work which cannot be justified by the doctrines applicable to those clauses
must fail. The factors determining the "reasonableness" of classifying aliens
separately are different where the work to which the alien is not given access
is done for the state as employer, and where the occupation is one in which the
state is not an employer, even though it may have the right under its police power
to regulate the business according to standards deemed socially necessary. Separate consideration of the constitutionality of the statutes discriminating against
aliens in each class of cases is therefore desirable.
It is generally stated that since the extension of the right of ownership, or
beneficial use of public property, or the opportunity to be employed in public enterprises is a privilege which the state in its capacity of proprietor or employer
may grant or withhold as it pleases, the exclusion of aliens is legally sustainable.
Thus statutes prohibiting the employment of aliens, or giving preference to citi5. Such statutes have uniformly been held to be unconstitutional. Truax v. Raich, 239
U. S. 33 (1915) (statute provided that every employer of more than five persons should not
employ less than 8o% citizens) ; In re Tiburcio Parrott, i Fed. 481 (C. C. D. Cal. i88o) (statute prohibiting corporations from employing any Mongolians) ; Fraser v. McConway & Torley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (D. Pa. 1897) ; Juniata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, 187 Pa. 193, 4o Atl. 977
(1898) (statute imposing tax on employers of adult male aliens) ; lit re Case, 2o Idaho 128,
116 Pac. 1037 (1911) (statute prohibited corporation from employing any non-declarant
alien).
6. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698 (1893) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915);
Arrowsmith v. Voorhies, 55 F. (2d) 310 (E. D. Mich. ig3). Although no statutes or decisioas have been found which involve the right of Congress itself to impose blanket occupational restrictions on aliens who are admitted to this country, it would seem that such enactment would be valid as to aliens coming into the country after its passage, since it would be
an exercise of Congress' right to impose conditions of admission. As to those already admitted, however, it could be objected that such legislation would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, contrary to the Fifth Amendment, which extends its protection to
aliens, they being "persons" within the contemplation of that Amendment. See Wong Wing
v. U. S., 163 U. S. 228 (1896) ; Ex parte Orozco, 21 Fed. lo6 (MV.D. Tex. 1912).
7. Whether a given classification is "reasonable" is based ultimately upon the value that
the court places on the social and economic considerations that prompted the legislature to
make it. It is this judicial appraisal of social necessity and social justice that determines the
limits of the police power. See Harper, Due Process of Law h; State Labor Legislation
(1928) 26 MicrE. L. REv. 599, 614.

8. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1885) ; Truax v. Raich; In re Case, both supra
note 5. But an alien who is not a resident of this country does not, of course, come within
the protection of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. See City Bank Farmers' Trust Co.
v. Bowers, 68 F.. (2d) 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). Thus wofkmen's compensation statutes
which prohibit or restrict benefits to be paid to non-resident alien dependents are generally
upheld. See Note (1926)

II MINN. L. REv. 57.

An alien who is illegally in the country does not appear to be afforded any rights under
the Federal Constitution, since his presence here is in defiance of the ability of this country
to enforce its own immigration laws. See Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279 (1904) ; Coules
v. Pharris, 212 Wis. 558, 250 N. W. 4o4 (1933). Even if such person were entitled to the
protection of the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses, any occupational legislation
discriminating against him would seem clearly sustainable as creating a "reasonable" classification.
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zens, 9 in public positions and on public works, have been held valid regardless
of the fact that no greater efficiency is sought to be effected thereby, on the ground
that since the citizeris of the state constitute the state, they are entitled to the
opportunities for work that its common resources afford.10 Likewise, statutes
prohibiting aliens from fishing " or gaming 12 or from obtaining licenses to drive
vehicles for hire " have been sustained as a proper refusal by the state to extend
to non-citizens '" a use of common property belonging to the citizens which would
give them an opportunity to earn a livelihood in competition with citizens."
But the doctrine that a state may withhold from aliens privileges, such as
the opportunity to work, which arise out of common property and resources is
not without limitation. There must be some relation between exclusion from
public works and property and the protection of public welfare. Although
separate classification of aliens is justified because of the absence of proprietary
interest of aliens in the resources and property of the state, the state probably
could not arbitrarily and in the absence of strong social desirability single out
any one class of aliens or individuals and deny them the right to work for it or
This is the same principle which forbids unreasonable disuse its property.'
criminations between different classes of citizens. In In re Ah Chong 1 a statute prohibiting aliens incapable of becoming citizens from fishing for the purposes
9. Alaska Laws 1929, c. 3o; Ariz. Laws 1931, c. 31; CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931)
Act 6430, § I (no aliens on public works except in emergency) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp.
1931) § 1117b (preference to citizens on public building construction) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS
(1932) c. 149, § 26 (citizens preferred in all state, county, and city positions) ; MICH. ComP.
LAwS (1929) § 762o (only citizens may be teachers); MoNT. REv. CODE (Choate, Supp.
1927) § 5653 (no aliens in public works unless necessary) ; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. i93o)
§ 185-1962 (only citizens may teach); N. J. Laws 1930, c. 76, 193I, c. 27 (only citi-

zens on public works, but declarants on state institution projects if necessary) ; N. Y.

CoNs.

LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 32, § 22 (citizens of N. Y. State only on state projects) ; ORE CODE
ANN. (1930) §§ 19-201, 19-202 (no Chinese or draft-dodging aliens on public works) ; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 43, § 151 (only citizens on public works unless funds derived
from assessments of benefits) ; TENN. CODE (Williams, Shannon, Harsh, 1932) § 2513 (teachers must be citizens) ; Tx. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1931) art. 288oa (teachers in public schools

must be citizens or declarants).
io. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915) ; People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 1O8 N. E. 427
(1915) ; Lee v. Lynn, 223 Mass. 1O9, iii N. E. 700 (1915).
ii. E. g., Mass. Laws 1932, c. 272; ORE. CODE A:NN. (1930) §40-512; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 193o) tit. 30, § 240.
12. E. g., Mass. Laws 1932, c. 272; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 57-401; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 34, § 9o2.
13. Georgia: Public Service Commission Regulation, October I, 1929. New Jersey:
Ordinance of Nov. 12, 1917. Rhode Island: Ordinance of Providence, c. 93, § 4-1920.

14. Not only are statutes which exclude aliens from the benefits of public property valid,
but ones which exclude citizens who are not residents of the state are held not violative of
Art. 4, § 2 ("privileges and immunities" clause), or the Fourteenth Amendment. McCready
v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1876) ; State v. Gallop, 126 N. C. 979, 35 S. E. i8o (19oo). See
Note (1929) 61 A. L. R. 337.
15. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914) (statute making it unlawful for aliens

to kill game and to that end making possession of shot guns and rifles by them unlawful upheld) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Cosick, 36 Pa. Co. 637 (19o9) ; Lubetich v. Pollock, 6 F. (2d) 237
(W. D. Wash. 1925) ; Commonwealth v. Hilton, 174 Mass. 29, 54 N. E. 362 (1899) ; Alsos v.
Kendall, ii Ore. 359, 227 Pac. 286 (1924) (fishing statutes valid). The use of the public
highways for driving vehicles for hire is a privilege which may properly be denied to aliens.
Morin v. Nunan, 91 N. J. L. 5o6, 1O3 Atl. 378 (ii8) ; Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 R. I. 333,
117 Atl. 359 (1922) ; cf. State v. Ames, 47 Wash. 328, 9z Pac. 137 (1907)

(alien could not

get pilotage license for navigable waters of the state).
16. See People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 167, io8 N. E. 427, 431 (1915) ; Powell, The
Right to Work for the State (1916)
(914), semble.

17.

2

Fed. 733 (C. C. D. Cal. 188o).

16 Co.

L. REv. 99; Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630
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of selling the fish caught was held unconstitutional as denying such persons equal
protection of the laws since they were no more dangerous than other aliens.
However, the large body of modern statutes excluding aliens incapable of attaining citizenship from holding property would seem to be valid since eligibility
to citizenship can well be said to be a reasonable basis of classification, a noneligible alien having a lesser interest in the welfare of the country.

s

A further limitation on the "common property" argument has received its
classic expression by Cardozo, C. J., in People v. Crane:
"Because the state may thus discriminate in favor of the citizen in
regulating employment on its public works, it does not follow, however, that
it may exclude aliens from the enjoyment of those works after they have
been completed. Aliens may use the public highways as freely as citizens.
Aliens may use railroads and other agencies as freely as citizens. The
reason is that the right to move about from place to place within the state
is incidental to the right to live within the state. There are probably many
other public works so intimately related, if not to life, at least to health and
comfort, that merely arbitrary or oppressive discrimination against the alien
in regulating their use would be a denial by the state of the equal protection
of the laws. To attempt to draw the line in advance is futile. The question
must in each case be whether the use is one that, is reasonably incidental to
life under modern conditions in a civilized state, or whether it is rather a
privilege which the state may grant or withhold." 19
This principle appears to be closely akin to the one that it is improper to
deprive an alien of substantially all opportunity to work since this would amount
to exclusion: the test here is that if the use of the public property in question
is such that if denied it would strongly tend to force the alien to leave by making
life in the state burdensome, it may not be denied to aliens even though such
ue incidentally has the effect of giving the alien an opportunity to earn a livelihood along with citizens. This rule, though not a well-defined one, would
properly preclude the application of the "common property" argument to private
occupations, even though in those occupations also the opportunity to work
profitably is derived ultimately from the existence of an organized and developed
state. However, the statutes hitherto enacted restricting the alien's participation
in public resources have kept within the limits of the states' power and although
many of them are far-reaching and often harsh in their human aspect, 20 their
legality does not seem to be subject to serious question.
Greater uncertainty exists as to the constitutionality of discrimination
against the alien in occupations in which the state is neither the employer or
proprietor. 2' Granting the "quasi-public" nature of the occupation-so that
18. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225 (1923) ; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U. S. 313
Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (923).
19. 214 N. Y. 154, 169, io8 N. E. 427, 432 (915).

(923);

2o. An increasing number of statutes deny to alien dependents benefits under old age
pension and other public aid provisions. CAI. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) § 5846; N. Y.
PUB. WELFARE LAW (1929) § 123; UTAH R1Ev. STAr. ANN. (933) § 19-12-3; Wash. Laws
1933,

C. 29,

§ 3; WIS.

STAT. (1929)

§ 49.22; Wyo. REv.

cant for old age pension must be citizen).
GEN. MUNIcIPAL LAW (1917)

STAT. ANN.

(1931)

§ 84-205 (appli-

IL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) c. 23, § 361; N. Y.

§ 153; N. D.

COMp. LAWs ANN.

(Supp. 1925)

§ 163 (citi-

zenship required under Mothers' Pension Laws). CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Mills, 1930) § 5046;
II. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 23, § III (aliens excluded from benefits for adult blind).
21. Citizenship or declaration of intention to become a citizen has been made a requisite
to engaging in many private occupations. Accountants: ALA. CoDE (Michie, 1928) § 16;
FLA. CoMP. LAws (1927) § 3923; HAWAII REV. LAws (1925) §.3676; IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) § 53-202; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. Iioa, § I; IND. ANN. STAT. (Bums, Supp.
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the state may under its police power legally impose reasonable regulations upon
it-the further question arises as to when economic and social conditions make
the exclusion of aliens from such occupations "reasonable", and not "arbitrary",
and therefore not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
1929) § 13696; IOWA CODE (1931) § 1905, c. 9; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, I93O) § 3941e-4; LA. GEN.
STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 9335; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 75a, § 6; MASS. GEN. LAWS
(1932) c. 112, § 87B; MICH. Comip. LAWS (1929) § 8651; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921)
§ 3241; NEV. Co tp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 252; N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) C. 270, § 3; N.
M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § io8-ioi; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 15, § 1492;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 7024b; N. D. ComP. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 557a-8;
§ 4310; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) §7090; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie,
OKLA. STAT. (93)
1932) § 7084; UTAH REV. STAT. (933) § 79-2-I; Vt. Laws 1931, No. 132; VA. CODE: (Michie,
1930) § 567. Airplane Pilots: Fed. Air Commerce Reg. (1929) c. 5, § 49; CONN. GEN. STAT.
(1930) §3O6i; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §65-316. Architects: GA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
§ 1905-b8; Ky.
1926) § 1754(58) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 53-402; IOWA CODE (93)
Laws 193o, c. 168, § 5; MICH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 8658; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Supp.
1933) c. 15, § 1478; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 68-305; S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 8194g;
VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 3145g; WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 8271; W. VA.
CODE ANx. (Michie, 1932) § 2958. Auctioneers: MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1929) § 7323. Barbers: IDAHO CODE (1932) §53-6o6; IOWA CODE (1931) §2585-613; WIS. STAT. (1931)
§ 158.08. Boiler Inspectors: N. J. Laws 1933, c. 168. Cosmetologists: IDAHO CODE (1932)
§ 53-1205; WIS. STAT. (1931) § 159.08. Members of Cosmetology Board: MIcH. COMP.
LAWS (Supp. 1933) § 8714-5. Court Stenographers: Colo. Laws (1925) c. 159. Dentists:
N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1933) c. 15, § 13o6. Embalmers and Undertakers: N. Y.
Coxs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 46, §§ 293, 295; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1933) tit. 63, § 478c;
S. D. Laws 1931, c. 216, § 3; Wis. STAT. (931) § 156.o2; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 37-104. Employment Agency Operators: IOWA CODE (1931) § 1551C-2; ORE.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 49-802; TEX. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1931) § 5221a-I; W. VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 2324. Engineers and Surveyors: IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, Supp.
1929) § 13886; MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 4666; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 15,
§ 1452; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 7070; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 193)
§ 114-io6. Insurance Agents: OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 193o) § 654(3). Persons
representing Self-insurers under Workmen's Compensation Act: N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill,
1930) c. 66, § 24a. Executors: MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 93, § 53. Junk Canvassers
and Pawnbrokers: VA. CODE (Michie, 193o) § 182. Mine Foremen and assistants in Coal
Mines: W. VA.. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §2426; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright,
193) § 23-128. Fire-bosses in Coal Mines: W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 2421. Shotfirers in Coal Mines: Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 23-165. Optometrists:
MICH. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 6783; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) § 3159; N.' M.
STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 98-io6; R. I. Laws 1928, c. 1235, § 2; TENN. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1932) § 7032; WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 1O15O. Osteopaths: FLA.
CoIP. LAWS (1927) § 3422. Peddlers: MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 101, § 22. Persons
selling beer and other alcoholic beverages: Iowa Laws 1933, c. 37; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 93,
§ 5; N. C. Laws 1933, C. 319; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1933) c. 2a, § 84; Okla.
Laws 1933, P. 342; Ore. Laws 2d Spec. Sess., 1933, c. 17; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1933) tit.
47, § 95; Tex. Laws 1933, c. 116; Wis. Laws 1933, C. 207. Pharmacists: CAI. CODES & GEN.
LAWS (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 5886(2); COLO. STAT. ANN. (Mills, 1930) § 5503; CONN.
GEN. STAT. (930) § 2825; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) C. 23, § 7; N. H. Pun. LAWS (1926) c.
210, § 18; N. J. Com.. STAT. (Supp. 1930) p. 1367; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) C. 15,
§ 1353; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1930) § 1304; R. I. Laws 1925, c. 794; UTAH REV.
§ 151.02. Dealers in
CODE (1932) § 79-12-I; Vt. Laws 1931, No. 131; WIs. STAT. (193)
Poisons who are not Pharmacists: S. D. Comn'. LAWS (1929) § 7846. Physicians: FLA.
Coip. LAWS (1927) § 3408; N. J. Cotp. STAT. (Supp. 193o) 966, § 127-31; N. Y. CONS.
LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 15, § 1256; R. I. Laws 1927, c. 1029; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 290. Pool
Room Operators: GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 1762(22). Podiatrists: FLA. Co iP.
LAWS 1927, § 3465. Private Bankers: N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 1930) 86.' Private Detectives: CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) § 2070 (3) ; MICH. CoiiP. LAWS (929) § 8716; N.
§ 175-07. Professional Men
Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 21, § 71; WIS. STAT. (93)
from other states: Neb. Laws 1933, C. 122, § 2. Real Estate Brokers: N. Y. CoNs. LAWS
(Cahill, 193o) c. 51, § 44oa; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 97-404. Members
of Real Estate firms and corporations: PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1933) tit. 63, § 436. Veterinarians: N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. I5, § 1326.
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The dogma is that if there is a substantial causal relationship between the
requisite of citizenship in the particular occupation and public health, safety
or morals, the exclusion of non-citizens is justified. In many occupations some
degree of dependence of public welfare upon the restriction of the right
to engage in them to citizens is apparent. The businesses of selling intoxicating
bevwages, 22 pawnbrokerage, 23 or the operation of pool-rooms 24 are so dependent upon practice by persons who have the best interests of the community at
heart and who will not engage in the undesirable or criminal practices which are
frequently attendant upon or associated with such businesses that exclusion of
aliens from them has been held to be valid on the ground that aliens as a class do
not have the necessary character qualifications. Similar reasoning has been
applied to the occupations of auctioneering, 25 and peddling,2 6 the classification of
citizenship being deemed a proper method of checking the evils connected with
those businesses. But in the latter business as in those of barbering and selling
fish and soft-drinks, some courts, with keener insight into the sociological problem involved, have held statutes excluding aliens to be unconstitutional as arbitrary discriminations, 27 there being no necessary causal connection between alienage and criminality in the regulated businesses. 2' However, in spite of the fact
that the courts may be fully convinced of the existence of such causal relationship, most of them are loath to hold such discriminatory legislation unconstitutional if there seems to be any possible correlation between alienage and the
particular local evil at which it is aimed. As was stated by Mr. Justice Stone in
Clarke v. Dekebach:
22.

Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md.

250, 20

At.

905

(i8go) ; Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio 253,

99 N. E. 309 (1912) ; De Grazier v. Stephens, ioi Tex. 194, io5 S. W. 992 (9o7)

; see Trim-

ble's License, 41 Pa. Super. 370 (igog) ; cf. Miller v. City of Niagara Falls, 2o7 App. Div.
798, 202 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1924) (ordinance prohibiting issuing of licenses to retail softdrinks to aliens sustained).
23. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332 (923), rezlg 122 Wash. 81, 21o Pac. 30 (1922),
and holding statute, though constitutional, in conflict with treaty, providing for reciprocity in
"commerce". See infra note 31, as to treaty conflict questions.
24. Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927) ; Anton v. Van Winkle, 297 Fed. 340 (D.
Ore. 1924) ; State ex rel. Balli v. Carrel, 99 Ohio 285, 124 N. E. 129 (1919).
25. Wright v. May, 127 Minn. i5o, 149 N. AV. 9 (914).
The court held the statute valid
"with some hesitation".
26. Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149 (1907).
27. State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 Atl. 165 (igoo) (peddling) ; Templar v. Board
of Barbers, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. io58 (19o2) (barbering) ; Poon v. Miller, 234 S. W.
573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (selling fish) ; George v. City of Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 Pac.
681 (1925) (soft drinks). Contra: Miller v. City of Niagara Falls, 2o7 App. Div. 798, 202
N. Y. Supp. 549 (924).

28. Although complete statistics and studies of the relationship between foreign nativity
and extraction and criminality have been made, there is a striking absence of material on the
correlation between alienage and criminality. However, some statistics are available. In
193o aliens constituted 4.8% of the total adult male population, and in 1920, 7%. In the tenyear period of 1920-3o, aliens comprised 19% of all the prisoners in Sing Sing prison, and in
1929, they composed 14.2% of the total inmates. These figures might seem to indicate some

causal relationship between alienage and crime. However, certain factors strongly point
away from such an inference. The poverty of aliens is probably attended by an inability to
secure proper legal defense, and convictions may for that reason be more numerous than
among citizens of equal guilt. And any of the numerous other important factors of environment and heredity which lead to individual aberration, may well be the real cause of such
criminality, rather than the incident of alienage.
Negroes made up 8.7% of the total adult male population in 192o and 8.9% in 193o, and
constituted 16.8%o of the inmates of Sing Sing prison in the period 192o-193o, and 22.2% in
1929, yet no legislative occupational discrimination has been deemed advisable. For statistics
of the composition of the criminal population and an analysis of the causes of crime see Report n the Causes of Crime (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
193).
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" . .The present regulation presupposes that aliens in Cincinnati
are not as well qualified as citizens to engage in this business. It is not
necessary that we be satisfied that this premise is well founded in experience. . . It is enough for present purposes [of testing its constitutionality]
that the ordinance, in the light of facts admitted or generally assumed, does
not preclude the possibility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment
and that we have no such knowledge of local conditions as would enable
us to say that it is clearly wrong. Some latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of
methods for controlling an apprehended evil. It was competent for the
city to make such a choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from
the conduct of a dubious business an entire class rather than its objectionable
members selected by more empirical methods." 29
The test used by the courts would thus seem to be that if there is a possible
relation between exclusion of aliens from a particular business and the public
welfare, the exclusion is sustainable, while if it is a manifestation merely of
class feeling and aimed at depriving an alien of opportunities simply because
he is not a citizen as are the rest, it is illegal. But an examination of the recent
legislation shows most of it to be of a nature which could not be sustained even
on the very liberal principles that have been laid down. A statute requiring
citizenship for doctors or embalmers is hardly sustainable on the ground that
aliens as a class might be more inclined to engage in the abuses made possible in
the course of such occupations, in view of the compelling fact that thorough
qualifications and requirements are imposed as conditions to entrance into such
callings. Likewise, it is hard to conceive of any possible impairment of social
efficiency or stability which would result were aliens who fulfilled all other legislative and administrative requirements permitted to practice barbering, or
podiatry, or shot-firing in mines. Such statutes can be seen only as arbitrary
discriminations against persons who are felt to be undeserving of work which
involves a degee of skill or prestige and as manifestations of nationalistic and
economic forces which make themselves felt particularly in times of unemployment.
Since only a few of the discriminatory acts and none of the more arbitrary
statutes have been brought before the courts as yet,30 their constitutionality can
for the most part only be the subject of speculation. Following strictly the rules
and language of previous cases, it would seem that if challenged they must fall.
However, the unwillingness of the courts in the past to hold statutes excluding
aliens from certain occupations invalid, even at the expense of deliberately overlooking forceful objections to constitutionality, strongly indicates the existence
of a social attitude toward the question from which an extension of protection
to the new statutes may perhaps be anticipated.
In upholding such a statute as one which limits the granting of licenses to
practice auctioneering to citizens by saying that the extension of the privilege
to engage in such occupation may be denied to aliens so that apprehended evils
may be avoided, the court seems to be motivated by an appreciation that very
little harm will result from the existence of such restriction, regardless of the
fact that according to strict principles of Constitutional Law it does deprive
aliens of liberty without due process of law and of equal protection of the laws.
On the other hand declaring the law invalid and thus disturbing the subtle but
powerful nationalistic and social feeling-tones which have gained expression
274 U. S. 392, 397 (1927).
3o. Notes 22 to 27, supra, contain all the cases that have been found testing the validity
of such statutes.
29.

LEGISLATION

in the discriminatory legislation might result in more serious ill-feeling and
administrative discrimination. While it might seem that an important balancing
consideration in favor of scrupulously avoiding arbitrary discriminations against
aliens would be the fear of creating international ill-will, actually the role
played by this factor is apparently very minor, for if the legislation does not
violate any governing treaty stipulations, 31 it does not create problems of international friction. Moreover, there is a lack of sympathy with the alien of long
standing who has not deemed it worth while to undertake the slight formalities
involved in taking out citizenship papers, or who is thinking of returning to his
native land with earnings accumulated in this country in competition with citizens. Also the attitude exists that any economic hardship imposed on the alien
by such legislation would in most cases be only temporary, since if he is of the
capabilities and character which would make him a desirable member of the
calling from which he is excluded, he may take out papers to become a citizen
and acquire the right to work that he desires. These elements add to the incentive to find "talking grounds" on which to avoid outlawing the legislation in
question.
Opposed to these considerations, however, are those of fairness and the
inescapable necessity of conformance with the rigid constitutional safeguards
which form the ultimate check upon state power. To discriminate as to the
ways of earning a livelihood appears to be a gesture that is inconsonant with
the vaunted American ideals of tolerance and equality. American citizenship
becomes a mere "job ticket" instead of a privilege to be sought as worthy in itself.
Moteover, no pressing necessity for such nationalistic measures is present and
the economic wisdom of the legislation is doubtful, since society is thereby deprived of the work of persons who may be well-fitted for the regulated occupations, and the likelihood of aliens becoming public charges is increased.
Legally, there seems to be no proper basis on which the statutes can be
upheld. Resort has been made to the reasoning that a license to engage in a
calling which is affected with a public interest is, like the opportunity to work in
public enterprises, a privilege which is in the control of the state as the trustee
for all the citizens and which may therefore be denied to all others.3 2 This
argument, however, does not appear valid in the teeth of the clearly proper limi31. The general rule is that where a statute is in conflict with the terms of a treaty, the
treaty takes precedence. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (392o). Although there are
legalistic arguments that may be presented both ways (for opposing views cf. Mikell, The
Extent of the Treaty-M1faking Power of the President and Senate of the U. S. (i9o9) 57 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 435, 528, with Anderson, Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making
Power, I Ax. J. INT. LAw (Part 2, i9o7) 636), the actual decisions of the courts show a
firmness in refusing to permit the treaty-making power to have the effect of encroaching upon
the police power of the state, and where a conflict between the two arises, the treaty is held

subservient to the state police regulation. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (194) ;
People v. Cannezzaro, 31 P. (2d) io66 (Cal. App. 1934).

Thus it has been held that statutes

excluding aliens from certain callings were not contrary to the usual treaty proviions that

each contracting nation will accord equal rights and privileges to citizens of the other contracting nation as it accords its own citizens. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (I915) ; Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 2o Atl. 905 (189o) ; People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, io8 N. E. 427
(1915). But it has been held that where a treaty provides that neither contracting party will
deny to citizens of the other rights in regard to "trade" and "commerce", the state may not

exclude such persons from any calling that comes within the definition of those words. See
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332 (1923), rev'g 122 Wash. 81, 210 Pac. 3o (1922) ; Poon v.
Miller, 234 S. W. 573 (Tex. Civ. App. I92I) ; cf. Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U. S. 392 (I97) ;
Webb v. O'Brien; Frick v. Webb, both spra note 15. See ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF AuSNxs
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1931)

119.

32. Askura v. Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 21o Pac. 30 (1922) ; see dissent in George v. City of
Portland, 114 Ore. 426, 235 Pac. 684 (925).
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tations on the "common property" argument which have been enunciated "I and
the settled principle that an alien is a person entitled to due process. Except in
the cases of denial of opportunities to work which arise out of public property
or resources or which are so closely allied with the workings of government that,
although private enterprises, they are quasi-political in nature,34 valid occupational discriminations against aliens as a class must be directed against evils
connected with the occupation. Where there is no substantial causal relation
between citizenship and the proper performance of the private occupation, the
statute cannot be upheld. In the statutes under consideration the really slight,
if any, causal connection 35 between alienage and the types of criminality attendant upon the regulated businesses does not seem to afford more than merely a
verbal ground for sustaining blanket legislative rather than selective administrative exclusion of aliens. The present statutes restricting the alien's right to
work in private callings are not based on the existence of such causal relationship
and when brought before the courts must perforce be held invalid as contrary
to the guarantees accorded to aliens as persons under the Federal Constitution.
L.H.
33. See supra p. 76.
34. Such as the profession of attorney at law, which is generally made conditional upon
citizenship. State v. Rosborough, 152 La. 946, 94 So. 858 (1922) ; In re Admission to the
Bar, 61 Neb. 58, 84 N. W. 611 (19oo) ; In re O'Neill, 9o N. Y. 584 (1882). Typical statutes
are: CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) § 59,(24) ; Me. Laws (1931) c. 176, § 26.

35. See stpra note 28.

